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Psychology, like all disciplines, has a history. Like all histories, it is a contested one, and it 
often unravels within a dominant narrative that might surprise you. For instance, the birth 
of the psychological laboratory in Leibzig, Germany in 1879, its founder Wilhelm Wundt, and 
the American behaviourist B.F. Skinner are considered far more influential to the 
development of contemporary psychological science than the psychoanalytic insights of Carl 
Jung or Melanie Klein. My teaching experience suggests that, in their vast majority, 
psychology undergraduates are left a little dissatisfied at the end of their degrees insofar as 
their understanding of human behaviour is concerned. Psychological knowledge in the last 
40 years has developed largely in silos and final year courses offer quite specialised 
explorations of processes (social, developmental, biological, or cognitive) that underpin 
human psychic life. Thus, rare opportunities are afforded for some sort of synthesis of 
perspectives that can form an even partially satisfactory answer to the question: ‘so, why do 
I do the things I do?’.  As academics, we face enormous pressure to profess expertise in 
specialised topics, publish our work in journals that mainly speak to other academics, and 
create our brand by accentuating the unique contribution(s) we have made to the discipline. 
‘I teach why people do the things they do’ sounds just as silly as it is impossible. But 
shouldn’t studying psychology help us understand ourselves and others around us?  
Cognitivism is a term that has been used to describe the influence of cognitive psychology 
(the study of mental processes such as attention, memory, and problem solving) on 
mainstream psychological theory as well as popular perceptions of human subjectivity. 
Experimental social psychology for instance talks of social cognition, namely what our brains 
do when we are in groups. Many theories suggest that the social world ‘enters’ individuals 
via biosensory pathways and cognitive mechanisms, which can be schematically 
represented as diagrams (and who doesn’t love a good, self-evident diagram?) and 
subjected to empirical testing. The brain (or ‘mind’) is widely hailed as the seat of selfhood, 
and I bet that if you asked people which organ represents them best, most people would 
pick their brains. That is, despite emerging evidence from medicine that implicates the 
digestive system (gut) in interesting psychophysiological processes, few people would name 
their intestines as the bit of tissue they would want preserved in a jar, and I am probably not 
one of them. Psychoanalytically speaking, there’s nothing surprising in the finding that the 
gut is a significant locus of psychological activity; after all emotions have to be symbolically 
digested somewhere. ‘One brain per person’ is how it works, and psychology loves some 
good old-fashioned dualisms. And so it has come to pass that psychology will leave the study 
of societies to sociology and social anthropology and cast its expert light on the unit of 
analysis that no mortal shall divide: the individual.  





Cognitivism seeps into all other branches of psychology; thus, a unitary subject that is 
knowable, predictable, and bound by reason emerges undisputed.  How I hear you ask? 
Let’s rewind. Cognitive psychology arose as a direct challenge to Watsonian ‘black box’ 
psychology, a necessary critique of the idea that humans are shaped solely by 
environmental contingencies and schedules of reinforcement. It blossomed in parallel with 
the computer revolution and adopted much of the language of computer science (input, 
network, information processing, mechanism etc). Some 70 years later, this language is not 
confined to the study of largely involuntary brain processes such as space perception or 
executive function. Quite the contrary, it has implied, assumed, and naturalised the reality 
underpinning most of human behaviour. It’s not cognitive psychology’s claims that solidify 
cognitivism, in fact cutting edge research in this area has probably moved beyond it.  This is 
how discourse (a devilishly slippery concept) works: an ideology such as the one we are 
dealing with can only become entrenched if it is propped up by a myriad of supporting 
beams. Cognitivism engulfs reality with every university psychology department that uses 
imagery such as an electrode-wired person to promote itself to prospective applicants (and 
funders). It lurks in the most innocuous of everyday utterances: ‘it’s all in your head’. And it 
goes unchallenged because no self-respecting psychologist would ever explicitly defend the 
position: ‘we are just our thoughts’.     
This creates several problems for contemporary psychology, if one takes that to mean the 
study of ‘why we do the things we do’. It is less of a problem if one is concerned with ‘how 
we do what we do’, but the critique still applies I believe. Humans are not like computers in 
that we possess a tricky little thing called consciousness and an equally tricky if not more 
tangible thing called the body. Let’s pretend that there’s no such tricky little thing as soul or 
spirit, otherwise this brief commentary will get derailed. How consciousness manifests, is 
embodied, and interacts with other conscious beings is, really, what psychologists are 
studying. We need access to more than just cognition to understand why people fall in love, 
why they fight, why they suddenly act in unpredictable ways, and what happens when many 
people co-exist for prolonged periods of time. Family dynamics, ambivalent friendships, and 
toxic couples won’t make much sense by illuminating the intricacies of individuals’ cognitive 
apparatus. Why we feel what we feel is, invariably, more interesting to the undergraduate 
student than why the ‘tip of the tongue’ phenomenon occurs. Affective cognition is 
cognitive psychology’s answer to the former. So what about relationships? Cue crickets.  
There are good reasons why cognitivism has prevailed, not least because it squares with 
scientific methods, Western biomedicine, and reasonable expectations for publicly funded 
psychological research to have utility and applied value. Measuring things and discovering 
variables that affect human behaviour often translates into practical solutions for many a 
modern malady. In consequence, mainstream psychology enjoys widespread applications in 
health, occupational, and even recreational settings. At the same time, we should not ignore 
the more sinister reasons. As it squares, it concurrently dovetails with an ideology of the 
human subject as a predictable, fixable machine that can be controlled and programmed. It 
delights advertisers who are in search of the ideal font, image, or message to feed 
consumerism. It makes sense to politicians who, through no fault of their own, are also 





entangled in its discursive net and therefore look to psychology to fix symptoms (or hide 
them) rather than transform conditions to prevent the problems in the first place. It makes 
people feel cleverer as it follows a rational methodology and can be delightfully illuminating 
to the mind that has been trained all its life to excel and produce without ever pausing to 
reflect on the unbearable question: ‘what and who am I producing for?’.  
A little context on the writer so that the reader can more fully appreciate the vested 
interests in this article (free tip: all discourse carries vested interests and (dis)locations of 
power). I studied for a 4-year experimental psychology degree, which I enjoyed, and my first 
job was as a statistics instructor for the university I graduated from. After a brief detour that 
involved meeting Avril Lavigne and dining with Patti Smith, I trained as a counselling 
psychologist. Whilst in training I took issue with several other assumptions counselling 
psychology made (the allure of cognitivism is perhaps less felt in this particular corner of 
applied psychology) but I finally found a home so to speak in another sub-discipline: 
community psychology. After struggling for many years, I can finally combine my passion for 
community psychology with my expertise as a counselling psychologist and proudly co-
organise the Community Psychology Festival, an annual event borne out of hope and 
glitter. Even though I write from this intersection, I am informed and shaped by theories and 
experiences that are not immediately apparent in my professional identities.  
It might therefore not surprise the reader to know that I take issue not with the very 
existence of cognitivism, but with its obliterating influence on all other ways of 
conceptualising human beings. I don’t for a second believe that we are rational and unitary; 
our internal worlds consist of affectively laden ‘bits’ that can be pre-verbal and unconscious 
(this is a Kleinian view) and I have started wondering whether producing a coherent self is 
more of a hassle than it is to surrender to the possibility of multiple selves, even if some of 
them are conflictually aligned against others. ‘Make happy thoughts’ is just about the worst 
advice you can give someone experiencing depression or anxiety. I have a problem with 
cognitivism’s unintended consequence of eradicating the social dimension of what it means 
to live and act in this world. I try hard to instil in my students a scepticism of mechanistic 
claims that do not recognise just how deliciously neoliberal their implications for the human 
condition are (see previous blog entry on ‘resilience’ by Dr Miles Thompson). Speaking of 
‘resilience’, this research paradigm is only just beginning to acknowledge that metals should 
be resilient, humans not so much. Imagine a person who suffers a messy breakdown at work 
when they are working on a temporary contract and their partner is diagnosed with a 
terminal illness, at a time when healthcare has been privatised. A breakdown is the healthy 
response here; that is what should happen in the name of ‘normality’. Quite what form that 
breakdown may take is a different matter; I do not wish to absolve our fictional friend from 
personal responsibility. I am not comfortable with ‘victim culture’ and people who are 
unwilling to locate their own complicity in their suffering; that is if social-material conditions 
allow for such agency. But to condone any notion that said fictional (yet easily recognisable) 
person will be described as ‘resilient’ if they continue to work with a stoic half-smile and be 
in rational control of their emotions is where I draw a line.  





No account can ever be ‘objective’, or definitive for that matter, and I do not wish to naively 
scapegoat cognitivism; rather I seek to re-iterate that complex institutional and social 
conditions have allowed it to enjoy unprecedented platforms (hello inane ‘wellbeing’ apps) 
and unchallenged status in the Western world. This point has been made before. Several 
times. It is articulated every time sacred wisdom such as the Buddhist practice of 
mindfulness is usurped, diluted, decontextualized, and packaged in a cognitivised version, 
easily available for mass consumption. Distinguished cognitive scholars have grappled with 
some of the issues described here, and some have actually protested the dominance of the 
machine as the ultimate metaphor to symbolise psychological activity (cf. Jerome Bruner’s 
work). How many psychotherapists must speak up to protest the irrational (the irony!) 
program of mass mental hygiene that IAPT has become? How many psychologists must 
swallow their ‘depression’ and ‘anxiety’ (50% at the last count) in mental health settings 
before we all agree: “The psychologists and their cognitive errors (‘I can’t cope’, ‘I’m not 
good enough’, ‘This is hopeless’) are not the problem here!” Clinical and counselling 
psychologists know that cognitive interventions have a place in working with distress, but it 
is certainly not the place they currently occupy. So you might ask, if this has been said many 
times before, and it is not a hugely incomprehensible point to get hold of, why is there need 
to still write about it? Hmmm…Let’s call it ‘selective attention’, shall we?    
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One novel and one TV show that stimulated this piece: 
‘The word for world is forest’ by Ursula K. Le Guin (1976) 
‘The OA’ by Brit Marling and Zal Batmanglij (2016-) 
 
Follow the Community Psychology Festival on facebook: 
https://www.facebook.com/communitypsychologyfestival/ 
 
